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THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL TORTURE OF AN
AMERICAN BY THE U.S. MILITARY: IS THERE A
REMEDY UNDER BIVENS?
Katrina Carmichael*
INTRODUCTION
After the conflict in Iraq began in 2003,1 two young American
civilians, Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel, moved to the war-torn
nation to help “rebuild the country and achieve democracy.”2 They
began work at an Iraqi security services company, but, after
becoming suspicious of illegal activity by their employer, they
volunteered as whistleblowers for the FBI.3 Following the company’s
discovery of Vance and Ertel’s espionage, the men were taken
hostage in the company compound by their employers.4 After calling
on their U.S. contacts for aid, the men believed they would be
rescued.5 However, Vance and Ertel were not rescued; instead, they
were apprehended by the U.S. military, taken to a detention camp,
and “tortured by their own government, without notice to their
families and with no sign of when the harsh physical and
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. Many thanks to Associate Dean
Kelly Cahill Timmons for her input and advice, and to my family and friends for their unending support.
1. In late 2002, the Senate authorized the use of U.S. military force in Iraq to “defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq . . . .” Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498. Later, in March of
2003, President George W. Bush ordered U.S. coalition forces to commence air strikes in Iraq. See
Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 342 (Mar. 19, 2003).
2. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, (Oct.
28, 2011), and rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012). See Thom Shanker & James Glanz, Civilians
Heading to Iraq to Aid Local Development, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2007, at A7 (discussing the challenges
civilians face when working alongside U.S. military in the rebuilding of Iraq); William Matthews, U.S.
Contractor Use in Iraq Expected to Rise, DEFENSE NEWS (July 12, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4704826 (examining the use of private contractors in the
redevelopment of Iraq’s infrastructure).
3. Amended Complaint at 7–11, Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (No. 06C-6964), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th. Cir. 2012). As informants for the FBI, Vance and Ertel reported
observations of “illegal arms trading, stockpiling of weapons, bribery, and other suspicious activity.”
Vance, 653 F.3d at 596.
4. Amended Complaint, supra note 4, at 24–25.
5. Id. at 26.
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psychological abuse would end.”6 Under such facts, most observers
would agree that a wrong has clearly occurred. And where there’s a
wrong, shouldn’t there be a remedy? Perhaps; but for Vance, Ertel,
and other plaintiffs like them, curing such a wrong is a complex
matter.
Under United States law, an American civilian who is tortured by
the government, especially while in a war zone, has limited options
for recovery.7 While federal statute provides a remedy for persons
deprived of constitutional rights by state officials under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, no such statutory equivalent exists when the same
deprivation of rights occurs at the hands of federal officials.8 Thus,
an American civilian whose constitutional rights have been violated
by a federal official is left with but one judicially created remedy:
Bivens, the common law right to sue a federal official who deprives a
citizen of his constitutional rights established in the 1971 case Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.9
However, Bivens may not be sufficient to establish a proper remedy
for constitutional violations, especially when courts are reluctant to
6. Vance, 653 F.3d at 596–97. Vance and Ertel were kept captive at Camp Cropper in Iraq for
several months before their release. Id. While in custody, they were strip-searched while blindfolded and
kept in intolerably cold cells with bright lights on constantly. Id. There were insects and feces on the
walls, and the plaintiffs were denied basic medical care and regularly deprived of food and water. Id. at
597. Further, they were forbidden from sleeping and were berated if ever caught doing so. Id. Physical
abuse included “hooding” and “wall[ing],” where they were slammed into walls while blindfolded. Id.
Lastly, the psychological abuse was relentless: the men were told they would never be allowed to leave
the detention facility if they did not “do the right thing,” despite full cooperation in their interrogations.
Id. Most disturbingly, they were kept in strict isolation, without contact with one another, their families,
legal counsel, or even clergy. Id. After the fiasco came to an end and Vance and Ertel returned to the
U.S., they filed a Bivens action against Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others for violation
of their constitutional right to due process. Id. at 598.
7. See generally Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured . . . .”); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (creating an implied right against federal officials parallel to the right established
against state officials in § 1983); see generally 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
§§ 14:1–:169 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing the development of Bivens and its relationship to § 1983).
9. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388; see also 2 SMOLLA, supra note 9, §§ 14:159:167 (discussing the
establishment of Bivens claims, under which a citizen deprived of his constitutional rights may sue
federal officials responsible for the violation).
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allow Bivens claims to proceed.10 Unfortunately for Vance and Ertel,
the Seventh Circuit denied their Bivens claims.11 Likewise, other
courts have similarly found a Bivens remedy untenable, finding that
Bivens claims have been severely curtailed in recent decades by the
Supreme Court’s insistence on deference to Congress.12 Several
courts and scholars have suggested that such deference to Congress is
appropriate; others have found that Congress’s failure to legislate on
the issue speaks to its desire to leave Bivens to the courts.13
In analyzing the extension of a Bivens remedy to American
civilians tortured by the U.S. military, this Note proceeds in four
parts. Part I traces the origin, development, and retraction of Bivens.14
Part II analyzes the competing judicial approaches in applying a
Bivens remedy for American citizens tortured by the federal
government, comparing Doe v. Rumsfeld, Lebron v. Rumsfeld, and
the majority opinion in Vance v. Rumsfeld, all of which denied a
Bivens action, to the dissenting opinions of Judges Hamilton,
Williams, and Rovner and the concurring opinion of Judge Wood, all

10. For recent cases holding a Bivens remedy unavailable, see Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617,
626 (2012); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 56162 (2007); Vance, 701 F.3d 193; Doe, 683 F.3d at
397; Lebron, 670 F.3d 540; Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574–77 (2d Cir. 2009).
11. Vance, 701 F.3d at 195.
12. See Doe, 683 F.3d at 394; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 544. A number of courts denying Bivens
remedies, including the Lebron and Doe courts, have focused on “special factors counseling hesitation,”
which the Court in Bivens identified as a requirement before a claim can proceed against a federal
official. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. Such special factors include the threat discovery poses to national
security, the potential interference of courts with military discretion, and the burden such litigation
places on limited government resources. Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548–52; Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762,
77374 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar, 585 F.3d at 574–77.
13. See Doe, 683 F.3d at 394 (noting that “the Supreme Court has never implied a Bivens remedy in
a case involving the military, national security, or intelligence”); Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548–52
(interpreting recent Supreme Court decisions as mandating a retraction of Bivens); George D. Brown,
“Counter-Counter-Terrorism Via Lawsuit”—the Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 848 (2009)
(highlighting the “need for judicial deference to the political branches” and suggesting that courts must
restrict Bivens when litigating constitutional claims arising from the war on terror). But see Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (“‘The duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a person on
trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure, and wherever the court is clearly satisfied that such
violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply the corrective.’” (quoting Fisher
v. State, 110 So. 361, 365 (Miss. 1926))); Vance, 701 F.3d at 210 (Wood, J., concurring) (suggesting
that a Bivens remedy is appropriate here because “[c]ourts must balance the risk of over-deterrence
against ‘the public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims.’” (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982))).
14. See discussion infra Part I.
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of which argued that a Bivens remedy is appropriate.15 Finally, Part
III proposes that Congress establish a Bivens remedy modeled after
an existing statute, such as § 1983 or the Torture Victim Protection
Act, and that, until Congress takes such action, courts should not
curtail Bivens beyond the already-established exceptions.16 Part IV
further proposes that the extension of Bivens is particularly
appropriate when American civilians’ constitutional rights are at
stake.17
I. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF BIVENS
A. Bivens Begins
Section 1983 of the United States Code provides a remedy for
civilians deprived of their constitutional or statutory rights by a state
government official.18 No such analogous federal statute exists.19
However, in 1971 the Supreme Court handed down a judicially
created remedy in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, establishing a right of action against federal
officials equivalent to that provided by § 1983.20 However, in Bivens,
Justice Brennan outlined two limitations under which a Bivens
remedy would be unavailable: (1) if Congress has provided an
adequate statutory alternative21 or (2) if “special factors counsel[]
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note). See discussion infra Part III.
17. See generally Ali, 649 F.3d 762; Arar, 585 F.3d 559; see also discussion infra Part III.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
19. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(establishing a remedy under the Fourth Amendment where no alternative remedy existed under a
federal statute). For a general discussion of the development of Bivens, see 2 SMOLLA, supra note 9,
§§ 14:159:167.
20. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388. In Bivens, the petitioner was subjected to a warrantless entry into his
apartment, where officers “manacled petitioner in front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest
the entire family.” Id. at 389. Later, he was subjected to a visual strip search. Id. In his action against the
federal government for violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court held that “‘where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a
general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done.’” Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
21. The Court found there were no alternative statutory remedies, noting “we have here no explicit
congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment
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hesitation . . . .”22 While the Court did not invoke such exceptions in
Bivens, it soon would.
B. The Development And Retrenchment Of Bivens
Bivens enjoyed a decade of acceptance and expansion by the courts
before facing restriction by the judiciary.23 In Davis v. Passman, the
Supreme Court extended Bivens to include Equal Protection
violations under the Fifth Amendment.24 Later, in Carlson v. Green,
the Supreme Court continued to expand Bivens by applying the
remedy to a claim of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.25 This expansion soon met resistance though,
resulting in a curtailment of its application.
In 1983, the Court began rejecting the extension of Bivens. In Bush
v. Lucas, the Court denied a Bivens claim because other statutory
mechanisms giving meaningful, albeit incomplete, remedies
existed.26 The Court also denied a Bivens remedy in Chappell v.
Wallace, finding that the unique disciplinary structure of the military,
coupled with the alternative system of justice in place for the
military, constituted “special factors” that ultimately barred military
personnel from bringing an action against their commanders.27
may not recover money damages from the agents.” Id. at 397.
22. Id. at 396–97. Justice Brennan suggested that such “special factors” may arise when considering
“federal fiscal policy,” when a congressional employee merely exceeds the bounds of authority
delegated to him rather than violates a constitutional provision, and when money damages may be
unnecessary to enforce the constitutional provision at issue. Id.
23. For a detailed discussion of both the early expansion and ultimate contraction of Bivens, see 2
SMOLLA, supra note 9, §§ 14:159:168.
24. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979) (allowing a claim against a congressman for sex
discrimination).
25. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 15 (1980). In Carlson, the Supreme Court again noted that Bivens
cannot be extended where a federal statutory alternative exists; however, it declined to hold that the
Federal Tort Claims Act provided such an alternative. Id.
26. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368–78 (1983) (declining to create “a new judicial
remedy . . . . paying particular heed . . . to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a
new kind of federal litigation” after an aerospace engineer was allegedly demoted and defamed by the
director of a federal space flight center).
27. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 296 (1983). Similarly, in United States v. Stanley, the
Supreme Court declined to recognize a Bivens action for a military veteran who had allegedly been
subjected to military experiments involving the use of LSD, reasoning that the disruption caused by
“judicial intrusion upon military discipline” was a significant enough factor to counsel hesitation in
application of the remedy. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681–83 (1987).
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Again, in Schweiker v. Chilicky, the Court held that Bivens could not
be invoked when an administrative program already provided
alternative relief.28 In Schweiker, Justice O’Connor made the
stringency of limitations on Bivens clear, stating, “[o]ur more recent
decisions have responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens
remedies be extended into new contexts.”29
The most decidedly damaging blow to Bivens came in 2007 with
Wilkie v. Robbins, where the Supreme Court denied a Bivens remedy
to a plaintiff alleging violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due
process.30 In Wilkie, government officials continuously harassed the
plaintiff in an attempt to coerce him into providing an easement
across his property.31 Despite the clear violations alleged and the lack
of alternative remedies, the Court emphasized the disfavor of Bivens
in recent years and explained, “Congress is in a far better position
than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation.”32
28. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (finding an administration program providing
for the review of termination of social security disability benefits constituted an “alternative remedy”).
29. Id. at 421; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61 (2001). In Malesko, the plaintiff, a federal prison inmate completing his sentence in a halfway
house, was forced to take five flights of stairs up to his room despite a known heart condition for which
he had approval to use the elevator. Id. at 6465. After suffering a heart attack, he sued the employees
of the correctional facility under Bivens. Id. However, the Court refused to let the action go forward
noting that “[s]ince Carlson we have consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context
or new category of defendants.” Id. at 68. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court ultimately held on the
sufficiency of the pleadings and did not deny a Bivens claim outright; however, the Court noted that
“[b]ecause implied causes of action are disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens
liability ‘to any new context or new category of defendants.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 675 (quoting
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68).
30. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 56162 (2007). In Wilkie, the government harassed the
plaintiff, Robbins, after discovering that it had failed to record an easement prior to transfer of the land,
and the new owner—Robbins—refused to re-grant the easement. Id. at 54143. Robbins sued under
Bivens, asserting a Fifth Amendment claim of retaliation by the government. Id. at 546. In rejecting the
plaintiff’s claim, the Court noted that an action under Bivens is “not an automatic entitlement” and that
“in most instances [the court has] found a Bivens remedy unjustified.” Id. at 550. Ultimately, the Court’s
decision rested on the fact that the government is bound to “drive a hard bargain” when negotiating
property claims and that allowing litigation for such an unclear constitutional claim as retaliation would
endanger the government’s resources and discretion. Id. at 55863. Justice Souter reasoned, “at this high
level of generality, a Bivens action to redress retaliation against those who resist Government
impositions on their property rights would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate governmental
action affecting property interests.” Id. at 561. He went on to say that “any damages remedy for actions
by Government employees who push too hard for the Government’s benefit may come better, if at all,
through legislation.” Id. at 562.
31. Id. at 56162.
32. Id. at 562 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983)).
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Most recently, in the 2012 case Minneci v. Pollard, the Supreme
Court denied a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and
unusual punishment when a federal prison guard allegedly denied
him necessary medical care.33 The Court, applying Wilkie, found that
because a private company ran the federal prison, the plaintiff could
sue the guard and the company as private defendants under state tort
law.34 Thus, an “alternative, existing process” provided protection for
the constitutional rights at stake, making Bivens an unnecessary and
inappropriate form of redress.35
C. A Recent Development: Bivens And Torture
In recent years, courts have refused to recognize a Bivens claim for
foreign citizens who have been mistreated or tortured while detained
by U.S. officials, finding that the “special factors” of foreign policy,
national security, and military autonomy counsel hesitation.36 In Arar
v. Ashcroft, the plaintiff—a dual citizen of Canada and Syria—was
detained and mistreated by U.S. officials and then removed to Syria,
where he was interrogated and tortured by the Syrian government.37
In denying a Bivens remedy, the Court held that “in the context of
extraordinary rendition, hesitation is warranted by special factors”38
and that “when a case presents the intractable ‘special factors’
apparent here, it is for . . . the elected members of Congress—and not
for us as judges—to decide whether an individual may seek
33. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620, 623 (2012).
34. Id. at 623–26.
35. Id.
36. See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563
(2d Cir. 2009). But see Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d
748 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Bivens did not preclude a remedy for an American citizen detained in
the United States because “special factors [do not] counsel hesitation where there is no authority
evidencing a remedial scheme for designation or treatment of an American citizen residing in America
as an enemy combatant”).
37. Arar, 585 F.3d at 565–66. The facts of Arar are all too chilling: after arrival in New York’s John
F. Kennedy Airport, Arar was interrogated for several days and was ultimately banned from the United
States for five years because the government felt his association with a known terrorist categorized him
as a “member of a terrorist organization.” Id. at 566. Despite his request to be removed to Canada,
where he worked and lived, the government removed him to Syria, where he was interrogated under
torture for over a year. Id. Over the course of that year, Syrian officials beat Arar with an electric cable
and confined him in an underground cell that only measured six feet by three feet. Id.
38. Id. at 563.
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compensation from government officers and employees . . . for a
constitutional violation.”39
In Ali v. Rumsfeld, nine plaintiffs, including five Iraqi citizens and
four Afghani citizens, sued Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and
others for violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment and
for violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.40 The nine men had been detained and
tortured at the Abu Ghraib and Bagram detention facilities in Iraq for
periods ranging from a few weeks to over six months.41 Despite the
horrific violations alleged by the plaintiffs’ complaint—including
physical, psychological, and sexual abuse—the Court denied a Bivens
remedy due to concern over special factors, observing that “allowing
a Bivens action to be brought against American military officials
engaged in war would disrupt and hinder the ability of our armed
forces ‘to act decisively and without hesitation in defense of our
liberty and national interests.’”42
39. Id. at 565. In analyzing “special factors” under Bivens case law, the court concluded that: (1)
special factors are limited to factors that “provoke ‘hesitation’” and do not include “countervailing
factors,”; and (2) that the standard for what constitutes a special factor counseling hesitation is
“remarkably low,” as “[h]esitation is a pause, not a full stop . . . and to counsel is not to require.” Id. at
573–74 (quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987)). Factors that the Court found
persuasive included the risk that courts might overstep the limits of their power and intrude into matters
of national security and foreign policy; the threat of revealing classified information; and the difficulties
associated with proceeding in open court, especially when considering that much of the information at
issue cannot be introduced into the public record. Id. at 574–77.
40. Ali, 649 F.3d at 76465.
41. Id. at 765–66. If the facts of Arar are chilling, then the facts of Ali are nothing short of atrocious.
Each of these nine men suffered extraordinarily inhumane treatment, including repeated beatings; sexual
assault; threats of death; deprivation of food, water, sleep, and necessary medical care; and prolonged
exposure to extreme temperatures. Id. (citing Consolidated Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief
and Damages ¶¶ 17–18, Ali, 649 F.3d 762 (Nos. 07–5178, 07–5185, 07–5186, 07–5187)). Arkan
Mohammed Ali, an Iraqi citizen held at Abu Ghraib, specifically alleges that “he was beaten to the point
of unconsciousness; stabbed and mutilated; stripped naked, hooded and confined in a wooden phone
booth-sized box; subjected to prolonged sleep deprivation enforced by beatings; deprived of adequate
food and water and subjected to mock execution and death threats.” Id .at 765 (citing Consolidated
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages, supra ¶ 18). Similarly, Najeeb Abbas
Ahmed, also held at Abu Ghraib, alleges that
soldiers held a gun to his head, threatened him with death and with life
imprisonment . . . , sexually assaulted him, stepped and sat on his body while he was in
extreme restraints, humiliated him by chanting racial epithets . . . , held him in an outdoor
cage . . . and intentionally deprived him of medical care after he “suffered more than one
heart attack and a possible stroke in detention.”
Id. (quoting Consolidated Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages, supra ¶ 21).
42. Id. at 773 (quoting In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 105 (D.D.C. 2007),
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These recent decisions all clearly restrict the use of Bivens in the
context of torture; however, the plaintiffs in these unsuccessful
torture-based Bivens actions share one key characteristic: their
citizenship.43 Until very recently, only non-resident aliens had
asserted claims of torture under Bivens, and thus limitations on the
application of Bivens had not yet extended to claims brought by
American citizens.44 As of 2011, however, claims involving
American citizens have been asserted.45
D. Reshaping Bivens: The Modern Battle Over Two Models
As is evident from the history of its applications, Bivens has
undergone significant transformation over the last thirty years. When
courts review Bivens claims today, they battle two interests: the
desire to supply a remedy where rights have been violated and the
desire to uphold the limits on Bivens delineated by the Supreme
Court.46 Unfortunately, these competing interests have divided the
aff’d sub nom, Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). In coming to its conclusion, the court
relied heavily on its decisions in Sanchez-Espinoza and Rasul II, both of which also denied relief under
Bivens to aliens subject to military abuse overseas. Id.; Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir.
2009); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Sanchez-Espinoza,
Nicaraguan citizens sued the President, CIA director, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense,
alleging that U.S. officials assisted Nicaraguan rebels who engaged in warfare, torture, and rape.
Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 205. There the lower court followed the Supreme Court’s trend in
limiting Bivens, finding that special factors counseled hesitation because “‘the danger of foreign
citizens’ using the courts in [such] situations . . . to obstruct the foreign policy of our government is
sufficiently acute that we must leave to Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy should exist.”
Id. at 209. In Rasul II, four British citizens sued Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others after being
detained and tortured at Guantanamo Bay. Rasul, 563 F.3d at 528. There the D.C. Circuit grounded its
holding in government officials’ qualified immunity, since the plaintiffs’ status as aliens precluded the
government from being on notice of any danger to non-citizens’ constitutional rights. Id. at 530.
However, the Court made clear that an alternative basis for precluding the claim could be established by
“special factors” which counseled hesitation, including “the danger of obstructing U.S. national security
policy.” Id. at 532 n.5.
43. Ali, 649 F.3d at 764; Arar, 585 F.3d at 565.
44. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 594–95 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, (Oct. 28, 2011), and rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (rejecting defendant’s argument that
Bivens claims of torture cannot be brought by U.S. citizens).
45. See, e.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
46. For a criticism of this divisive approach, see Brown, supra note 14, at 853–54. Brown suggests
that Bivens decisions fall into two models: the Marbury-rights model, which emphasizes protection of
Constitutional rights, and the prudential–deferential model, which emphasizes separation of powers and
deference to Congress. Id.; see also Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions,
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judiciary, both in general approaches to the Bivens analysis and in
answering the specific question of whether a Bivens remedy is
available for American citizens who are allegedly tortured by
American military personnel.47
II. ANALYZING THE JUDICIAL SPLIT: DEFERENCE VERSUS
INTERVENTION
A. The Competing Perspectives
Almost every case establishing a constitutional claim against a
government official comes down to a balancing test: do the interests
of the private individual outweigh the interests of the government?48
And yet, the most recent Bivens decisions have arrived at inconsistent
conclusions when balancing these interests. In 2011, three courts
considered Eighth Amendment Bivens claims brought by American
citizens against the U.S. military. A Seventh Circuit panel and the
District Court for the District of Columbia permitted a Bivens remedy
for U.S. citizens tortured by U.S. military personnel, whereas the
District Court of South Carolina halted Bivens actions at the
National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 203–04 (2010) (suggesting that
adherence to either Bivens model—categorical deference or interventionism—is flawed and positing an
innovation-eliciting approach that would encourage the entities being regulated to work cooperatively to
craft remedies for those deprived of constitutional rights).
47. Vance, 701 F.3d at 197 (majority opinion); id. at 211 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); Doe, 683 F.3d at
394; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548.
48. For example, many courts analyzing whether to grant a habeas corpus petition to a person
tortured or detained by the U.S. government engage in a balancing test, relying on Mathews v. Eldridge,
which defined the test as weighing the private interests of the individual against the government’s
interests. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
531 (2004); Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 263 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom., Al-Marri v.
Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). In Hamdi, the Court applied the Mathews balancing test and recognized
the strong weight on the private individual’s side to be “free from involuntary confinement by his own
government without due process of law.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531.
Courts analyzing Bivens claims made by civilians tortured by the U.S. military engage in a similar
quasi-balancing test. Vance, 701 F.3d at 197 (majority opinion); id. at 211 (Wood, J., concurring); Doe,
683 F.3d at 394; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548. Those courts do not use the formal structure laid out in
Mathews v. Eldridge, but instead rely on the framework set out in Wilkie v. Robbins, which analyzes: (1)
alternative remedies; and (2) special factors. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). Nonetheless,
they still balance similar considerations, weighing the government’s interest in maintaining military
discretion and security (special factors) against the individual’s interest in maintaining his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Vance, 701 F.3d at 197 (majority
opinion); id. at 211 (Wood, J., concurring); Doe, 683 F.3d at 394; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548.
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summary judgment stage.49 Those three decisions have all since been
appealed and either reversed or affirmed.50
First, in January 2012, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of a
Bivens claim in Lebron v. Rumsfeld.51 Second, in June 2012, the D.C.
Circuit reversed the D.C. district court’s decision and denied a Bivens
remedy.52 And most recently, in November 2012, the Seventh Circuit
reheard Vance v. Rumsfeld en banc and reversed the panel decision,
causing a sharp divide in the court, with the majority denying a
Bivens remedy for Vance and Ertel, but with four judges firmly
disagreeing and instead recommending that the Bivens claim go
forward.53
Those cases share similar facts, and the considerations on both
sides of the scale are more or less equitable.54 And while all three
courts ultimately denied the plaintiffs’ Bivens suits—deferring to the
military, Congress, and the government’s interest in protecting
national security—the dissenting opinions in Vance make a strong
counterargument for bringing the scale down on the side of personal
liberty.55 How did these judges—when faced with nearly identical
facts—come to such different conclusions? They drew their
conclusions from inherently and diametrically different beliefs
regarding the duty and role of the court.56 The four judges in Vance
49. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 626 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, (Oct.
28, 2011), and rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100 (D.D.C.
2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 800 (D.S.C.
2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
50. Vance, 701 F.3d at 197 (majority opinion); Doe, 683 F.3d at 394; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548.
51. Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548.
52. Doe, 683 F.3d at 394.
53. See generally Vance, 701 F.3d 193.
54. Id. at 197; id. at 211 (Wood, J., concurring); Doe, 683 F.3d at 394; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548.
55. Vance, 701 F.3d at 197 (majority opinion); id. at 211 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id. at 205
(Wood, J., concurring); id. at 225 (Rovner, J., dissenting); id. at 226 (Williams, J., dissenting); Doe, 683
F.3d at 394; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548.
56. While the key distinction of these cases comes down to the role of courts, many other
considerations arise out of Bivens actions that are beyond the scope of this Note. Specifically, even if a
court allows a claim to proceed under Bivens in theory, surpassing that threshold is only the first step.
Qualified immunity then poses a second hurdle, by insulating government officials from liability.
Neither Doe, Vance, nor Lebron reached the question of qualified immunity, resolving the case in favor
of the defendants on other grounds. Vance, 701 F.3d at 205 (majority opinion); Doe, 683 F.3d at 397;
Lebron, 670 F.3d at 556. The 2011 Seventh Circuit panel decision in Vance did consider qualified
immunity, however, and tackled a number of complicated legal questions, including issues of
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who found a Bivens remedy was appropriate—Judges Hamilton,
Wood, Williams, and Rovner—believe it is the court’s duty to uphold
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and to act assertively in the face of
congressional silence.57 Contrarily, the Fourth Circuit, the D.C.
Circuit, and the majority of the Seventh Circuit believe their duty is
one of deference—to the military, to the executive branch, and to
Congress.58
B. Vance, Doe, And Lebron: Denying Bivens In Cases Of U.S.
Citizens Tortured By U.S. Military Personnel
The leading case on the torture of an American citizen by the U.S.
military is Vance v. Rumsfeld, a November 7, 2012, Seventh Circuit
en banc decision denying recovery under Bivens.59 A few months
prior to the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the D.C. Circuit issued its
ruling in Doe v. Rumsfeld, reversing the lower court and denying a
Bivens remedy as well.60
Both cases presented a similar set of facts, although divergences in
their fact patterns warrant a brief review.61 Like the plaintiffs in
sufficiency of the pleadings, notice to the defendants, supervisory liability, and the existence of
precedent clearly establishing “precise constitutional contours applicable to the detention of
individuals—citizen and non-citizen alike—seized in a foreign war zone.” Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d
591, 605–11 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, (Oct. 28, 2011), and rev’d, 701 F.3d
193 (7th Cir. 2012). These broad and complicated issues are not issues that can be taken on in a footnote
and are best left to another Note, another time. Compare Denise Gilman, Calling the United States’
Bluff: How Sovereign Immunity Undermines the United States’ Claim to an Effective Domestic Human
Rights System, 95 GEO. L.J. 591 (2007) (arguing that sovereign immunity, including qualified immunity,
should be eliminated when dealing with claims of constitutional violations), with Bardo Fassbender,
Can Victims Sue State Officials for Torture?: Reflections on Rasul v. Myers from the Perspective of
International Law, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 347 (2008) (discussing issues raised by the qualified immunity
defense in the context of international law).
57. Vance, 701 F.3d at 218 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (noting that “[u]nder the majority holding
here . . . U.S. courts are closed to U.S. citizens who are victims of torture by U.S. military personnel
[while being open to non-citizens]. The majority thus errs by attributing to Congress an intention to
deny U.S. civilians a right that Congress has expressly extended to the rest of the world”).
58. See Lebron, 670 F.3d at 549–52. The court relied on policy set forth in United States v. Gilman,
explaining that “[b]eing judicial requires that we be judicious, and adherence to our constitutional role in
this area requires that we await ‘affirmative action by Congress.’ Put simply, creating a cause of action
here is ‘more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 513 (1954)).
59. Vance, 701 F.3d at 193 (majority opinion).
60. Doe, 683 F.3d at 390.
61. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Vance, who went to Iraq as contractors for a private security
company, the plaintiff in Doe—also an American citizen—traveled
to Iraq to work for a private defense contracting firm.62 However,
unlike Vance and Ertel, Doe was a United States Army veteran, and
he soon began work as an Arabic translator for the United States
Marine Corps Human Exploitation Team, an intelligence unit that
gathered information about Iraqi contacts through highly secretive
meetings.63 When Doe attempted to travel home to the United States
for annual leave, the Navy Criminal Investigative Service detained
him for interrogation.64 Just as Vance and Ertel had, Doe ultimately
found himself at Camp Cropper.65 There he was held in solitary
confinement for three of his nine-month stay and subjected to torture,
including exposure to extreme cold and light, sleep deprivation, and
repeated choking.66 Doe was never charged with a crime, and
eventually the military released him.67
Lebron v. Rumsfeld also involved an American citizen alleging
torture by the U.S. military.68 In that case, the Fourth Circuit found
the risks to national security constituted “special factors counseling
hesitation” and barred the Bivens claim.69 The facts of Lebron, while
similar to the facts presented in Vance and Doe, present some key
differences. First, the plaintiff in Lebron, Padilla, was not captured in
a war zone, although his apprehension was during wartime and in

62. Doe, 683 F.3d at 392.
63. Id. As part of his work with the Human Exploitation Team, Doe established contact with Iraqi
Sheik Abd Al-Sattar Abu Risha and served as a central point of contact between the Sheikh and the
Marine Corps. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 100 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir.
2012). Doe stated that as a result of communications established by him during the team’s secret
meetings with the Sheikh, “the Sheikh pledged to support the United States and ultimately became ‘one
of America’s staunchest allies.’” Id. at 101.
64. Doe, 683 F.3d at 392.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The government held two hearings on Doe’s status, but they never gave Doe access to an
attorney or to evidence used against him. Id. Despite being released and never charged with a crime, the
United States military still maintains Doe’s name on a “blacklist” that prevents defense contracting
firms from hiring him and on a terrorist “watch” list that makes international travel nearly impossible.
Id.
68. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 545 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
69. Id. at 548.
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relation to a war—the war on terror.70 Second, he was held in a
facility located in the U.S. rather than one located overseas.71
Third—and perhaps most significantly—Padilla was ultimately
convicted of the terrorist activities for which he was detained—
having planned with members of Al Qaeda to detonate bombs within
the United States.72 But the divergences in facts end there, as Padilla,
like Vance, Ertel, and Doe, was an American citizen and was
similarly treated during his detention.73
The opinions in Vance, Doe, and Lebron each rely on three central
arguments: (1) Bivens precedent disfavors creating new causes of
action, especially when related to military conduct; (2) the “special
factors” of improper judicial intervention in military affairs and the
risk of disclosing state secrets “counsel hesitation”; and (3) the
doctrine of separation of powers requires that new causes of action
under Bivens be left to Congress, especially when Congress has
already established a position regarding military torts.74 All three
courts approach each case similarly, using the framework set forth in
Wickle v. Robbins, which outlines a two-part inquiry, asking (1)
whether there are alternative remedies available to the plaintiff and
(2) even if no alternative remedies exist, whether “special factors
counsel[] hesitation.”75 This analysis focuses on the second part of
that inquiry–whether any special factors counsel hesitation.76
70. See id. at 545.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 544–45. To explain further: Padilla was traveling from Pakistan to Chicago when he was
detained by Customs officials in the O’Hare International Airport. Id. at 545. He was later transferred to
a naval brig in South Carolina, declared an enemy combatant by President George W. Bush, and held
incommunicado from legal counsel, family, and friends for over three years. Id.; Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1012–14 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012). There, he was allegedly
interrogated and tortured by U.S. military officials, who deprived him of sleep, shackled him, exposed
him to extreme temperatures and lights, engaged in sensory deprivation, denied him access to the Koran
and other religious items, denied medical care, and threatened him with death. Id. at 1013–14. For
further details of this case, see the related decision in Padilla v. Yoo, and for information on the complex
procedural history of the case, see Padilla v. Hanft, which addressed Padilla’s petition for habeas corpus
in relation to this same serious of events. Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Hanft,
423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
73. Lebron, 670 F.3d at 544–45; Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1012–14.
74. See generally Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012); Lebron, 670 F.3d 540.
75. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007); Vance, 701 F.3d at 199; Doe, 683 F.3d at 393;
Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548. The test Wilkie set forth provided:
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1. Unfavorable Precedent: A Historical and Comparative Analysis
of Bivens Denials
The Lebron and Doe courts and the majority in Vance all focused
on the lack of precedent favoring Bivens claims.77 In their analyses,
they found that for decades the Supreme Court has limited the
expansion of Bivens78 and that recent decisions from lower courts
have also declined to extend Bivens beyond the ambit of already
recognized contexts.79 They relied specifically on Chappell v.
In the first place, there is the question whether any alternative, existing process for
protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain
from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages. But even in the absence of an
alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment: “the federal courts must make the
kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying
particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing
a new kind of federal litigation.”
Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
76. Although Doe, Lebron, and Vance acknowledge the “alternative remedies” prong of the Wilkie
test, all three courts focus their discussion on whether “special factors counsel[] hesitation.” Vance, 701
F.3d at 199; Doe, 683 F.3d at 393; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548.
77. Vance, 701 F.3d at 198–99 (“Whatever presumption in favor of a Bivens-like remedy may once
have existed has long since been abrogated.”); Lebron, 670 F.3d at 54748; Doe, 683 F.3d at 394–96.
All three courts emphasized the limited extension of Bivens into new contexts, with the Doe court
explaining:
In the forty-two years since the Supreme Court decided Bivens, only twice has it
extended Bivens remedies into new classes of cases—once in the context of a
congressional employee’s employment discrimination due process claim, and once in the
context of a prisoner’s claim against prison officials for an Eighth Amendment violation.
In 1988, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[o]ur more recent decisions have
responded cautiously to suggestions that Bivens remedies be extended into new contexts.”
More recently, the Court explained that “[b]ecause implied causes of action are
disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability to any new context or
new category of defendants.”
Id. at 394 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
78. The courts relied on: Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988), where the Supreme Court
denied Bivens for social security cases; United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987), and Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), where the Court denied Bivens remedies for military servicemen;
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009), where the Court emphasized its reluctance to extend Bivens
“to any new context or new category of defendants”; Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 537, where the Court denied an
action to a property owner alleging the use of coercive tactics by the government in their obtaining of an
easement; Lucas, 462 U.S. at 367, which denied a First Amendment action for a federal employee;
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 61 (2001), which emphasized the Court’s
reluctance to expand Bivens into new legal territory; and Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 618 (2012),
which most recently denied an Eighth Amendment claim against employees of a privately-operated
federal prison. See generally Vance, 701 F.3d 193; Doe, 683 F.3d 390; Lebron, 670 F.3d 540; discussion
supra Part I.
79. Vance, 701 F.3d at 195 (“This appeal presents the question whether the federal judiciary should
create a right of action for damages against soldiers . . . who abusively interrogate or mistreat military
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Wallace, United States v. Stanley, Arar v. Ashcroft, and Ali v.
Rumsfeld, all of which denied Bivens claims to plaintiffs alleging
misconduct or torture by the military because the risks of intervening
in military and foreign policy and of exposing national secrets
constituted special factors counseling hesitation.80 In particular, all
three courts emphasized the position of Stanley—that “[i]n the
military context, the Court has explained that ‘the insistence . . . with
which the Constitution confers authority over the Army, Navy, and
militia upon political branches . . . counsels hesitation in our creation
of damages remedies in this field.’”81
Further, the Vance majority and the Doe court dismissed concerns
over citizenship, arguing that the foreign citizenship of the plaintiffs
in Arar and Ali (as opposed to the American citizenship of the
plaintiffs in Vance) was not a distinguishing factor among the cases
where precedent established that prohibiting claims by foreign
citizens would negatively affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and
national security.82 As explained by the Vance majority, “[w]e do not
think that the plaintiffs’ citizenship is dispositive one way or the
other. Wallace and Stanley also were U.S. Citizens. The Supreme
Court has never suggested that citizenship matters to a claim under
Bivens.”83 Thus, despite factual differences between the citizenship
and civilian statuses of the plaintiffs in Vance, Doe, and Lebron and
prisoners . . . . Both other courts of appeals that have resolved this question have given a negative
answer . . . . We agree with those decisions.” (citing Lebron, 670 F.3d 540; Doe, 683 F.3d 390; Ali v.
Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011))).
80. Vance, 701 F.3d at 198–99 (“The Supreme Court has never created or even favorably mentioned
the possibility of a non-statutory right of action for damages against military personnel, and it has twice
held that it would be inappropriate to create such a claim for damages.” (citing Chappell, 462 U.S. at
296; Stanley, 483 U.S. at 678)); Lebron, 670 F.3d at 54748; Doe, 683 F.3d at 394–96; see also Arar v.
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574–77 (2d Cir. 2009); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103–07 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub
nom, Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
81. Doe, 683 F.3d at 394 (quoting Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682); Vance, 701 F.3d at 199–200; Lebron,
670 F.3d at 548. In Stanley, the Supreme Court—relying on the Feres doctrine—held that a Bivens
remedy could not be available for injuries arising “out of or . . . in the course of activity incident to
service.” Stanley, 483 U.S. at 673 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
82. Vance, 701 F.3d at 203; Doe, 683 F.3d at 394–95.
83. Vance, 701 F.3d at 203 (internal citation omitted). The majority continued, “It would be
offensive to our allies, and it should be offensive to our own principles of equal treatment, to declare
that this nation systematically favors U.S. citizens over Canadians, British, Iraqis, and our other allies
when redressing injuries caused by our military or intelligence operations.” Id.
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the statuses of the plaintiffs in Arar, Ali, Chappell, and Stanley, the
Doe, Vance, and Lebron courts found such precedent—which
discourages application of Bivens in the military context—
persuasive.
2. “Special Factors”: Risks to Military and State Secrets Favor
Dismissing a Bivens Claim
The opinions in Lebron, Doe, and Vance ultimately rested on the
finding that “special factors counsel[] hesitation,” including (1) the
impact of judicial intervention in military and foreign affairs and (2)
the risk of disclosing state secrets.84
a. The Impact of Judicial Intervention in Military and Foreign
Affairs
All three courts found that the risk of the judiciary intervening in
national security matters and intruding upon the authority of the
Executive branch in carrying out military action should counsel
hesitation in permitting a Bivens claim.85 The concern of the courts in
negatively impacting the military is two-fold.
First, military affairs are not a “core area[] of judicial
competence”; therefore, judges may be prone to make mistakes or
venture upon policy decisions outside the ambit of the judiciary’s
authority.86 Second, by delving into such affairs, the judiciary would
likely disrupt the military chain of command, distract its officers
84. Id. at 199–203; Doe, 683 F.3d at 394–96; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 551–55.
85. Vance, 701 F.3d at 200–03; Doe, 683 F.3d at 394–96; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 551–55. The Doe
court recognized several special factors, including the
importance of “[p]reserving the constitutionally prescribed balance of powers”; the
sensitive nature of the allegations involved in detainee cases; the need to review the
military command structure in order to determine liability; and administrability concerns
regarding the need to require current and former officials to testify about the rationale for
the policy at issue.
Doe, 683 F.3d at 395 (quoting Lebron, 670 F.3d at 544–54).
86. Lebron, 670 F.3d at 552; see also Vance, 701 F.3d at 200–01 (“If the judiciary never erred,
damages awards against soldiers and their civilian supervisors would be all gain and no loss. But judges
make mistakes: They may lack vital knowledge, may accept claims that should be rejected on the facts
or the law, or may award excessive damages on justified claims or create supervisory liability when they
shouldn’t.”).
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from their duties, and misdirect limited resources into defending and
managing such litigation.87 The majority in Vance specifically
expressed concern for the distraction of cabinet officials, explaining,
“[a] Bivens-like remedy could cause other problems, including
diverting Cabinet officers’ time from management of public affairs to
the defense of their bank accounts.”88
The courts also drew support from case law warning of the dangers
of judicial interventionism.89 In particular, the courts in Doe and
Vance both heeded the Supreme Court’s advice in its 1981 opinion,
Haig v. Agee, which cautioned that “‘matters intimately related
to . . . national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial
intervention.’”90
b. The Risk of Disclosing State Secrets
The Doe, Vance, and Lebron courts also found that the risk of
disclosing state secrets constituted a “special facto[r] that counsel[s]

87. Vance, 701 F.3d at 200–01; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 553; Doe, 683 F.3d. at 395–96. Doe
summarized these concerns:
[Allowing] the complaint [to proceed] would require a court to delve into the military’s
policies regarding the designation of detainees as “security internees” or “enemy
combatants,” as well as policies governing interrogation techniques.
Doe’s allegations against Secretary Rumsfeld implicate the military chain of
command and the discretion Secretary Rumsfeld and other top officials gave to NCIS
agents to detain and question potential enemy combatants. The allegations raise questions
regarding Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal control over the treatment and release of
specific detainees. Litigation of Doe’s case would require testimony from top military
officials as well as forces on the ground, which would detract focus, resources, and
personnel from the mission in Iraq. And . . . allowing such an action would hinder our
troops from acting decisively in our nation’s interest for fear of judicial review of every
detention and interrogation.
Id.
88. Vance, 701 F.3d at 202. In response to this reasoning, Judge Wood explained in his concurrence
that he had no concern that “Bivens liability would cause Cabinet Secretaries to carry out their
responsibilities with one eye on their wallets, rather than for the greater good of their department and the
country” and instead found such a suggestion by the majority “disrespectful of both the dedication of
those who serve in government and the serious interests that the plaintiffs are raising.” Id. at 210 (Wood,
J., concurring).
89. Vance, 701 F.3d at 199 (majority opinion) (“[C]ivilian courts should not interfere with the
military chain of command—not, that is, without statutory authority.” (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 300 (1983))); Doe, 683 F.3d at 394–96; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 553–55.
90. Vance, 701 F.3d at 200 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)); Doe, 683 F.3d at 395
(quoting Haig, 453 U.S. at 292).
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hesitation.”91 Specifically, military officials would be required to
testify “concerning the details of their military commands” and to
“convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a wide range of military
and disciplinary decisions.”92 Further, by requiring discovery, courts
risk exposing state secrets and compromising the safety of military
operations.93 And lastly, to investigate the plaintiffs’ complaints, the
military would have to explain its rationale for its detainee policy and
thus reveal military intelligence and tactics.94
3. Deference to the Legislature: Who Should Extend Bivens?
A final and key consideration discussed in each opinion was
whether deference to Congress was appropriate.95 All three courts
chose to defer to Congress because: (1) the doctrine of separation of
powers requires judicial restraint; and (2) Congress has already
established some legislation regarding military torts and seemingly
intentionally omitted the provision of other statutory relief.96 First,
the Constitution is explicit in its conference of decision-making
powers related to the military on Congress, as it grants Congress both
the enumerated powers to declare war and to establish armed
forces.97 The Lebron court again drew support for this position from
precedent, citing Chappell v. Wallace and United States v. Stanley,
91. Vance, 701 F.3d at 200 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lebron, 670
F.3d at 553–55; Doe, 683 F.3d at 394–96.
92. Lebron, 670 F.3d at 553 (quoting United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 682–83 (1987); United
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)).
93. Vance, 701 F.3d. at 202–03 (noting that “a court would find it challenging to prevent the
disclosure of secret information [and that] anyone, whether or not a bona fide victim of military
misconduct, could sue and then use graymail (the threat of disclosing secrets) to extract an undeserved
settlement”).
94. Lebron, 670 F.3d at 553. The Lebron court expounded upon these concerns:
Any defense to [Bivens] claims—which effectively challenge the whole of the
government’s detainee policy—could require current and former officials, both military
and civilian, to testify as to the rationale for that policy, the global nature of the terrorist
threat it was designed to combat, the specific intelligence that led to the application of
that policy to [the plaintiff], where and from whom that intelligence was obtained, what
specific military orders were given in the chain of command, and how those orders were
carried out.
Id.
95. Vance, 701 F.3d at 199–203; Doe, 683 F.3d. at 396; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548–52.
96. Vance, 701 F.3d at 199–203; Doe, 683 F.3d. at 396–97; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548–52.
97. Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548–49.
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opinions that both emphasize Congress’s control over military affairs
as delegated by the Constitution and recognize Congress’s control as
“explicit and not merely derivative of other powers.”98
Second, all three courts found that Congress has already indirectly
spoken to the issue of compensating victims of military misconduct,
thus deference to Congress’s implicit position is warranted.99 In
support of this view, they cited Congress’s action in creating the
Military Claims Act, which provides up to $100,000 from public
funds to any person injured by the military; the Foreign Claims Act,
which also provides compensation for those injured by the military in
a foreign nation; and the Detainee Treatment Act and Military
Commissions Act, both of which prohibit torture by the U.S.
military.100 Further, the Doe and Vance courts posited that Congress
had intentionally omitted a cause of action for American citizens
tortured by the U.S. government when it created the Alien Tort Act,
the Detainee Treatment Act, and the Torture Victim Protection
Act.101 And, as precedent has mandated, when “Congress has
intentionally withheld a remedy . . . we must most refrain from
providing one.”102

98. Id. The Lebron court also relied on Rostker v. Goldberg, in which the Court emphasized
separation of powers concerns when military control is at issue, noting that “‘in no other area has the
Court accorded Congress greater deference.’” Id. at 549 (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–
65 (1981)). The court in Vance also drew support from Chappell and Stanley, finding that “Congress
and the Commander-in-Chief, . . . rather than civilian judges, ought to make the essential tradeoffs, not
only because the constitutional authority to do so rests with the political branches of government but
also because that’s where the expertise lies.” Vance, 701 F.3d at 200 (citing United States v. Stanley,
483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983)).
99. Vance, 701 F.3d at 199–203; Doe, 683 F.3d. at 396; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548–52.
100. 10 U.S.C. § 2733 (2006); id. § 2734; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd–2000dd-1; Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note); Vance, 701
F.3d at 200–01; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 551–52 (“Congress was no idle bystander to this debate. Indeed, it
devoted extensive attention to the precise questions [the plaintiff] presents pertaining to the treatment of
detainees and to the legitimacy of interrogation measures.”).
101. Vance, 701 F.3d at 201–02; Doe, 683 F.3d. at 397. The court in Doe explained, “Congress [has
never] extended a cause of action for detainees to sue federal military and government officials in
federal court for their treatment while in detention. It would be inappropriate for this Court to presume
to supplant Congress’s judgment in a field so decidedly entrusted to its purview.” Id.
102. Doe, 683 F.3d at 397 (quoting Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
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C. Disagreement Among The Seventh Circuit: A Case For Bivens
For U.S. Citizens Tortured By The Military
While the courts in Vance, Doe, and Lebron ultimately found that
the considerations weighed in favor of denying a Bivens action, it is
easy to imagine that other courts might tip the scales in the other
direction. In fact, in Vance itself the outcome was not unanimous.103
Judge Wood wrote a concurrence in favor of a Bivens remedy,
agreeing only with the majority insofar as it granted Secretary
Rumsfeld qualified immunity, and Judges Hamilton, Williams, and
Rovner all wrote vehement dissents challenging the majority’s
interpretation of the “special factors” requirement.104
The judges grounded their disagreement with the Vance majority
on four principle arguments: (1) precedent—including cases cited by
the majority—strongly favors a Bivens remedy in cases concerning
the torture of U.S. citizens by the U.S. military; (2) Congress’s past
legislation has impliedly recognized a Bivens cause of action for such
plaintiffs; (3) the American citizenship of the plaintiffs is a
distinguishing factor in such claims; and (4) policy concerns over the
implications of torture mandate a remedy.105
1. Precedent: A Favorable History
Judge Hamilton, who authored the most extensive dissent, found
support for a Bivens remedy in precedent.106 First, courts have
repeatedly made Bivens available to prisoners who are mistreated in
federal prison, allowing Eighth Amendment claims alleging cruel and
unusual punishment.107 Second, civilians in the United States may
103. Vance, 701 F.3d at 211–24 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id. at 205–11 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at
225 (Rovner, J., dissenting); id. at 226 (Williams, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 211–24 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id. at 205–11 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 225 (Rovner,
J., dissenting); id. at 226 (Williams, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 211–24 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id. at 205–11 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 225 (Rovner,
J., dissenting); id. at 226 (Williams, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 211–17 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 213. Judge Hamilton relied on Carlson v. Green, where the Supreme Court allowed a
deceased prisoner’s representative to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment after prison
officials deprived the petitioner of necessary medical care. Id. (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980)). He also found support in subsequent cases, such as Bagola v. Kindt, permitting a claim for a
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state a Bivens claim against military personnel who violate their
constitutional rights, typically in cases of unreasonable searches or
the use of excessive force under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.108
Third, the Supreme Court made clear in Reid v. Covert that civilians
carry their constitutional rights with them when they travel abroad.109
And fourth, courts continually permit suits against Cabinet officials,
such as Secretary Rumsfeld, despite concerns over holding such
high-level officials accountable.110 Judge Williams similarly found
support in precedent, noting that judicial interference with military
affairs has historically been permitted where constitutional rights are
at stake.111
Judges Hamilton and Williams also disagreed with the majority’s
characterization of Chappell v. Wallace and United States v. Stanley,
finding those cases provided support—rather than disapproval—for a
Bivens remedy in Vance and Ertel’s case.112 In particular, both
Chappell and Stanley based their holdings on the Feres doctrine,
which prohibits military personnel from suing their superiors for
injuries “incident to [military] service.”113 However, Vance and Ertel
were mere civilians, not members of the military, and thus the Feres

prisoner injured during a prison work program, and Del Raine v. Williford, allowing a Bivens action by a
prisoner forced to sleep in a bitterly cold cell. Id. (citing Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1997);
Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1994)).
108. Id. (relying on Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) a Supreme Court case recognizing a Fourth
Amendment claim after a military police officer used excessive force on a civilian, and noting several
circuit court cases extending the remedy).
109. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Vance, 701 F.3d at 214. In Reid, Justice Black affirmed
citizens’ rights abroad, stating, “[w]hen the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad,
the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.” Reid, 354 U.S. at 5–
6.
110. Vance, 701 F.3d at 214–15.
111. Id. at 228–29 (Williams, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Williams relied on several Supreme Court
cases recognizing the judiciary’s place in restraining the military when necessary, including Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Id. at 229. He
emphasized, “[e]xecutive power to protect national security or conduct foreign affairs does not deprive
the judiciary of its authority to check abuses that violate individual rights.” Id.
112. Id. at 215–16 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id. at 226–28 (Williams, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 215–16 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (noting that “[n]othing in Chappell hinted that its
reasoning would apply to civilians whose constitutional rights were violated by military personnel, and
it is well established that the Feres doctrine does not apply to claims by civilians”).
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doctrine would not extend to the circumstances of their
detainment.114
2. Congress’s Implied Recognition of Bivens for American Victims
of Torture: A Look at Existing Legislation
In addition to finding support in case law, Judges Hamilton, Wood,
Williams, and Rovner found support in Congressional action.115 First,
the Detainee Treatment Act provides an affirmative “good faith”
defense against civil claims for government officials who believed
their actions were legal and authorized.116 And while Congress did
not explicitly state what potential civil liability it had in mind when
creating that defense, only one—the civil claim against federal
officials that had existed for forty years—was clearly implied:
Bivens.117
Second, the dissenting judges also examined the Alien Tort Statute
and the Torture Victim Protection Act, both of which provide a cause
of action for aliens tortured by another foreign government.118 After
examining those acts, they found that it would be irreconcilable,
unsettling, and even hypocritical for Congress to provide a statutory
remedy to aliens who are tortured by either the U.S. or their own
114. Id. at 215–16; id. at 226–28 (Williams, J., dissenting) (“This court’s decision leaves unexplained
how or why a suit by an American civilian, with no connection to the chain of command, would
interfere with military discipline in the manner anticipated by Chappell and Stanley.”).
115. Id. at 205–11 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 211–24 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id. at 225–26
(Rovner, J., dissenting); id. at 226–32 (Williams, J., dissenting).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006); Vance, 701 F.3d at 219 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
117. Vance, 701 F.3d at 220. In support of his reading of the Detainee Treatment Act to imply a
Bivens cause of action, Judge Hamilton explained:
Young doctors are taught, “When you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras.” The
point is that when trying to explain an unknown phenomenon, it’s usually sensible to
look first to the familiar and only later to the exotic. That reasoning applies here. When
Congress created the limited good-faith immunity from civil claims by aliens in the
Detainee Treatment Act, Bivens had been a major part of U.S. law for 40 years.
Id. Judge Wood similarly found that Congress could only have been referring to Bivens when it
provided a “good faith” defense to federal officials, as it had done in the earlier Westfall Act of 1988. Id.
at 208 (Wood, J., concurring).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note) (“An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an individual to torture . . . or (2) subjects an individual
to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages . . . .”); Vance, 701 F.3d at 209; id. at
218 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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government while simultaneously precluding any remedy for its own
citizens.119
Third, and finally, Judges Wood and Hamilton found that even the
State Department took the position that Congress intended to provide
a Bivens remedy to victims of torture by the U.S. military. That is,
when the United Nations questioned the United States’ compliance
with international treaties against torture, the U.S. assured the United
Nations that a Bivens remedy was available to those tortured by the
U.S. military.120
3. American Citizenship: A Key Factor in the Provision of a
Bivens Remedy
Judges Wood, Hamilton, Rovner, and Williams all disagreed with
the majority’s view that the plaintiffs’ American citizenship was not
a dispositive factor.121 The majority argued that it would be
“offensive to our allies” to provide a Bivens cause of action to U.S.
citizens alone without recognizing foreign citizens as well.122
However, as explained by Judge Hamilton, although prohibitions
119. Vance, 701 F.3d at 218–19. Judge Hamilton continued:
The majority thus errs by attributing to Congress an intention to deny U.S. civilians a
right that Congress has expressly extended to the rest of the world. A victim of torture by
the Syrian military, for example, can sue in a U.S. court, but a U.S. citizen tortured by the
U.S. military cannot. That conclusion should be deeply troubling, to put it mildly. We
should not attribute that improbable view to Congress without a far more compelling
basis than the majority offers.
To illustrate this anomaly further, suppose another country has enacted its own law
identical to the U.S. Torture Victim Protection Act. Under the majority’s reasoning, there
are no “adequate and available remedies in the place” where the conduct occurred (a U.S.
military base). If Mr. Rumsfeld could be found visiting a country with its own TVPA (so
he could be served with process), plaintiffs Vance and Ertel could sue him in that country
under its TVPA because U.S. law would provide no remedy. Surely the Congress that
enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act would rather have such claims against U.S.
officials heard in U.S. courts.
Id.
120. Id. at 208 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 219 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); United States Written
Response to Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Apr. 28, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68554.htm. The State Department wrote, “U.S. law provides various
avenues for seeking redress, including . . . suing federal officials directly for damages under provisions
of the U.S. Constitution for ‘constitutional torts’ [as established by] Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents.” Id.
121. Vance, 701 F.3d at 209 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 221–22 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 203 (majority opinion).
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against torture “reflect basic and universal human rights” granted to
all, a distinction based on citizenship is prudent where the current
system leaves American citizens without a remedy.123 Indeed, “[i]f
the U.S. government harms citizens of other nations, they can turn to
their home governments to stand up for their rights. That is not true
for these U.S. citizens alleging torture by their own government. No
other government can stand up for them.”124
Further, statutes and previous case law have repeatedly made
distinctions based on citizenship. First, both the Torture Victim
Protection Act and the Alien Tort Statute provide remedies for aliens
only, and thus distinguish statutory remedies based on foreign
citizenship.125 Second, in Johnson v. Eisentrager and Munaf v.
Geren, the Supreme Court distinguished between citizens and aliens
when addressing the provision of civilian courts for U.S. military
detention overseas.126 Both cases insisted that aliens in military
custody overseas could not seek habeas corpus relief in U.S. civilian
courts but recognized that Americans in custody should be entitled to
such relief as citizens.127
Last, Judges Hamilton and Williams noted that a further
distinction among citizens—between enemy combatants and ordinary
civilians—may be pertinent.128 In particular, Judge Williams
challenged the majority’s misplaced reliance on Lebron v. Rumsfeld,
where the plaintiff—although an American citizen—was a member
of al Qaeda, had been designated an enemy combatant by the
123. Id. at 221 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 209 (Wood, J., concurring). Judge Wood explained the discrepancy in the law as such:
[I]f it were true that there is no Bivens theory under which a U.S. citizen may sue an
official of the U.S. government (including a military official) who tortures that citizen on
foreign land under the control of the United States (including its military), then U.S.
citizens will be singled out as the only ones without a remedy under U.S. law. That is
because existing law permits a U.S. citizen to sue a foreign official, and an alien can sue
anyone who has committed a tort in violation of the law of nations. Only by
acknowledging the Bivens remedy is it possible to avoid treating U.S. citizens worse than
we treat others.
Id.
126. Id. at 221–22 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 685–88 (2008);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 785 (1950)); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
127. Vance, 701 F.3d at 221–22 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S at 685–88; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 785).
128. Id. at 221; id. at 230 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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President, and later was convicted of treason.129 He distinguished the
plaintiffs in Vance, who were not designated enemy combatants but
were merely ordinary citizens.130 Judge Hamilton agreed, explaining,
U.S. courts have been reluctant to extend constitutional
protections to [enemy combatants]. . . . [but] [w]e do not need to
decide those difficult issues in this case, which was brought not
by members of al Qaeda or designated enemy combatants, but by
U.S. citizens working for military contractors and trying to help
131
the FBI. . . .

4. Policy Concerns: Upholding the Duty of the Court
Ultimately, the dissenting judges in Vance concluded that while
some factors may counsel hesitation, those factors do not outweigh
the risk to the individual liberty of American citizens.132 A policy
argument—the interest in safeguarding constitutional liberties—
underscored the judges’ positions.133 Putting it plainly, Judge
Williams stated:
Every member of this court recognizes that the job of the
military is challenging, dangerous, and critical to our national
security. For these reasons and more, members of the armed
forces enjoy unparalleled respect in our society. But this respect
does not put the military’s highest officers beyond the reach of
the Constitution or adjudication by Article III courts. We would
abdicate our duty if we permit Bivens to become a
129. Id. at 230.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 221 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). Judge Hamilton continued, “[t]he enemy combatant cases
are difficult, but we should not let those difficulties lead us to turn our backs on legitimate constitutional
claims of U.S. citizens.” Id.
132. Id. at 211–24; id. at 205–11 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 225 (Rovner, J., dissenting); id. at 226
(Williams, J., dissenting). Judge Wood emphasized the high stakes of the conduct at hand stating,
“[c]ivilized societies do not condone torture committed by governmental agents, no matter what job title
the agent holds.” Id. at 205 (Wood, J., concurring). “I am confident that every member of this court
would agree with that proposition.” Id. “This is therefore a case of system failure . . . .” Id.
133. Vance, 701 F.3d at 211–24 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id. at 205–11 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at
225 (Rovner, J., dissenting); id. at 226 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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mirage. . . . [W]e have an independent obligation to individual
citizens and to the Constitution to apply the precedent even in
difficult cases. Otherwise we risk creating a doctrine of
constitutional triviality where private actions are permitted only
134
if they cannot possibly offend anyone anywhere.

Ultimately, the opinions in Lebron, Doe, and the majority opinion
in Vance held on ideological grounds diametrically opposed to those
of Vance’s dissenting and concurring judges. Judges Hamilton,
Wood, Williams, and Rovner felt judicial intervention was the only
appropriate remedy absent Congressional action to the contrary.135
But for the majority in Vance and the courts in Lebron and Doe, the
absence of express Congressional authorization gave them pause and
their hesitations outweighed any desire to remedy the wrong.136
Despite these differences in ideology, however, a solution is
nonetheless possible. By looking to Congress, applicable legislation,
and policy considerations for guidance, the courts may be able to
navigate similar Bivens claims in the future.
III. PROPOSING A REMEDY THROUGH AN EXAMINATION OF MODEL
LEGISLATION AND EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS
A. A Resolution From Congress
Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have expressed a
desire and need for Congress to legislate on the topic of Bivens.137
Therefore, the ideal solution to the confusion surrounding Bivens is
for the legislature to act. If Congress chooses to legislate on this
matter, it has two options in approaching the issue: (1) it can legislate
broadly by codifying Bivens, modeling such a statute after § 1983; or,
134. Id. at 230.
135. Id. at 211–24 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id. at 205–11 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 225 (Rovner,
J., dissenting); id. at 226 (Williams, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 193 (majority opinion); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Lebron v.
Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
137. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983));
Vance, 701 F.3d at 203; Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548; Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 580–81 (2d Cir.
2009).
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(2) it can legislate narrowly by providing a cause of action for this
particular type of plaintiff for this specific violation—that is, the
subjecting of an American civilian to torture by the U.S. government.
1. Broad Legislation
If Congress wants to codify Bivens in its entirety, then § 1983—
the equivalent action for constitutional violations by state officials—
provides a model statute.138 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
139
laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .

As is clear from the broad language of the statute, such as “every
person,” “any citizen or other person,” and “Constitution and laws,”
§ 1983 encompasses a wide range of claims against state officials.140
Therefore, a Bivens claim using similar language would also
encompass a variety of claims against federal officials. Further,
modeling a Bivens statute after § 1983 could be very effective, as
§ 1983 has been well-received in the legal community and is often
praised.141 As Justice Brennan once observed, “[i]t would be difficult
to imagine a statute more clearly designed ‘for the public good,’ and
‘to prevent injury and wrong,’ than § 1983.”142

138. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675–76 (2009) (noting that “the
[Bivens] implied cause of action is the ‘federal analog to suits brought against state officials
under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983’”).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
140. Id.; see also 2 SMOLLA, supra note 9, §§ 14:8, :104 (discussing the Supreme Court’s broad
construction of the law and noting that § 1983 is used in virtually every conceivable setting to enforce
every conceivable right in the Constitution).
141. See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 14:7.
142. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 73 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (praising the
policy promoted by § 1983 and expressing admonition after the Court denied a claim under the statute).
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Nonetheless, § 1983 may be too wide-reaching to model a Bivens
statute after. First, the Supreme Court has construed the requirement
that the action be “under color of law” broadly, only mandating that
there be “[m]isuse of power” and that the power be “made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.”143 Second, § 1983 allows claims brought under the Constitution
and other laws, exceeding those Constitutional claims permitted
under Bivens to include claims brought under any federal statute or
regulation.144 Last, unlike in Bivens actions, the exhaustion of
alternative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a § 1983
claim.145 These differences may lead Congress to fear the expansion
of Bivens under such all-encompassing statutory language. If that fear
restrains Congress, then a narrower statutory scheme may be
appropriate.
2. Narrow Legislation
An alternative to the wide-ranging codification of Bivens is the
codification of certain claims under Bivens, and in particular, claims
by U.S. citizens asserting torture at the hands of the U.S. government.
The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which provides a cause
of action for an individual subjected to torture under color of foreign
law, provides an appropriate model for such a statute.146 The
pertinent portion of the TVPA states, “An individual who, under
actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual . . . .”147
143. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). Section 1983 was developed as part of the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, but the statute was not regularly used to bring claims until it was revitalized
in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 14:2. Since then, § 1983 has been used as the
prominent means of vindicating rights deprived by persons acting under color of state law. See id.
§ 14:104.
144. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430–32 (1987)
(extending § 1983 claims to rights established under federal regulations); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1, 4 (1980) (holding that rights established under any federal statutes can be enforced under § 1983).
145. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 427–28; 2 SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 14:112.
146. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note).
147. Id.
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As evidenced by the TVPA’s language, it is a narrow act, only
permitting a claim against “[a]n individual” acting “under . . . color
of law [] of [a] foreign nation” and only for the specific act of
torture.148 If modeled after such terms, a Bivens statute could be
narrowly written to include only claims by American citizens against
individuals acting under color of federal law for allegations of
torture.149 Further, the TVPA requires that the claimant first exhaust
all alternative remedies available to him or her in the place where the
violation occurred.150 Congress could easily adapt this prong of the
TVPA in a Bivens statute to reflect the common law requirement that
the court first determine whether adequate alternative remedies
exist.151 In formulating this narrower statute, Congress could also
look to the TVPA as an indication of how and to what extent a Bivens
torture statute would be used.152
3. Congressional Silence
Despite multiple invitations from courts to legislate on the issue of
Bivens, Congress has still not acted. Some courts interpret this silence
as an indication that Congress disapproves of the extension of
Bivens.153 Others interpret its silence as acquiescence to the
148. Id. The TVPA also allows a claim against an individual who “subjects an individual to
extrajudicial killing” in a wrongful death action. Id.
149. It is also useful that the TVPA, like Bivens, developed out of existing case law governing human
rights claims. VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S.
COURTS § 9:18 (2d ed. 2012). In codifying the case law, Congress faced similar concerns as those here
regarding the maintenance of a narrow claim reflective of limits already carved out by the judiciary. Id.
150. Torture Victim Protection Act, § 2. (“A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if
the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving
rise to the claim occurred.”).
151. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007); see discussion supra Section II.B.1.
152. In general, the TVPA has been applied narrowly, although there have been some expansions of
the act. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 150, § 9:20. First, even though the act is codified in the
Alien Tort Statute, courts have held that not only do aliens have standing to bring TVPA claims against
foreign officials, but U.S. citizens may as well. Id. § 9.20 n.6 (citing Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402
F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2005)). Second, courts have expanded the TVPA’s definition of torture—the
intentional infliction of “severe pain or suffering . . . whether physical or mental . . . ”—to include
deprivation of basic necessities, such as lights, a bed, windows, clothing, and bathroom facilities.
Torture Victim Protection Act, § 2; Surette v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 231 F. Supp. 2d 260, 264
(D.D.C. 2002); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 45 (D.D.C. 2000).
153. McIntosh v. Turner, 861 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1988). In McIntosh, the Eighth Circuit held that
a Bivens claim cannot exist where Congress has omitted a constitutional tort claim when legislating on
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application of Bivens and tacit approval of Bivens as an effective way
to handle such claims.154 In either case, this silence suggests that
Congress has no intention of legislating on the issue in the near
future. Therefore, while modeling a Bivens statute after § 1983 or the
TVPA is an ideal solution, courts must be prepared to address the
split between the District of Columbia and the Seventh Circuit
without help from Congress.
B. Resolution By The Courts: The Argument For A Judicial
Consensus
Without an express indication from Congress that it disapproves of
the application of Bivens within the context of the torture of
American citizens, the judiciary should adopt the position of the
dissenting judges in Vance and allow those claims to proceed.155 In
support of that position, note that the denial of a Bivens claim to
American civilians alleging torture by their own government would
result in two anomalies. First, a comparison of Bivens claims to
actions under § 1983 demonstrates the potential incongruity that
would occur if a citizen was granted a remedy against a state official
but not against a federal official for the same violation. Second, an
examination of the TVPA shows that Congress has provided broader
and more effective statutory remedies for foreign citizens against
their governments for torture than for its own American citizens.

the precise subject, unless the omission was “inadvertent.” Id. They explained:
It may be true that injured citizens will thus receive less than “‘complete relief,’” but that
is a decision that Congress has both the power and the competence to make. To some it
may seem odd that congressional silence can, in effect, limit the right to be fully
compensated for constitutional wrongs, but that is the message of [the Supreme Court’s
decision in] Chilicky, and we are obliged to heed it.
Id. (citation omitted).
154. Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 208 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 219–20
(Hamilton, J., dissenting); see also Brown, supra note 14, at 868 (noting that interpretation of
congressional silence is a key source of tension in the Bivens debate, dating back to the original
decision, where the dissenters were “reluctant to create a ‘freestanding’ constitutional remedy” without
express congressional authorization).
155. Vance, 701 F.3d at 205–11 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 211–25 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); id. at
225–26 (Rovner, J., dissenting); id. at 226–31 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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1. The Incongruent Treatment of State and Federal Officials
Section 1983 provides a remedy for citizens whose constitutional
rights are violated by individuals acting under color of state law,156
while Bivens—applied broadly—provides a similar remedy to
citizens deprived of constitutional liberties by individuals acting
under color of federal law.157 However, if courts adopt the limitation
of Bivens advocated for by the Fourth Circuit in Lebron, the Seventh
Circuit in Vance, and the D.C. Circuit in Doe, citizens asserting a
remedy under Bivens will be afforded lesser protection of their
constitutional rights than those stating a claim under § 1983. Surely
such a result is incompatible with basic principles of justice.158
To illustrate, imagine two events: scenario A and scenario B. In
scenario A, the governor of a state in the U.S. condones the torture of
a man being detained, pending criminal charges. In scenario B, the
Secretary of Defense condones the torture of the same man. The
same wrong has occurred to the same plaintiff; the only difference is
whether the official committing the constitutional violation was a
state official or a federal official. To allow a remedy in scenario A
under § 1983 but not in scenario B under Bivens seems nothing short
of hypocritical. Just as § 1983 provides the opportunity to hold state
officials accountable, Bivens should provide the same opportunity to
hold federal officials accountable to the same extent.159

156. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
157. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
158. Without venturing into a discussion of the Equal Protection Clause and its effect on
constitutional rights, it is worth noting that the United States has a history of grappling with inequality
and the law, which informs modern day notions of justice. See generally JAMES A. KUSHNER,
GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 1:1:7 (2012–2013 ed.
2012).
159. See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State
Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2208 (2003) (positing that while § 1983
is limited to actions against state officials, the Supreme Court has “inferred a parallel damages action
against federal officers” under Bivens); Marc Stepper, Note, A Government Lawyer’s Liability Under
Bivens, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 454 (2010) (suggesting that “[b]ecause Bivens ‘is the
federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . § 1983’ [identical] types of suits should
arguably apply in many of the same instances”).
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2. The Incongruent Treatment of Foreign and American Citizens
If courts find the inconsistency between actions under § 1983 and
actions under Bivens unpersuasive, they must still address the
discrepancy between the remedies afforded to foreign citizens and
the remedies afforded to American citizens. This discrepancy should
not only shock the courts; it should sway them. The single most
convincing argument that Judges Wood, Hamilton, Williams, and
Rovner make in Vance is this: the plaintiffs in Vance were
American—not foreign—citizens acting as ordinary civilians—not as
military personnel.160 This is not just a semantic, or even factual,
distinction; this is a legal distinction. It is not a coincidence that
courts have most vigorously limited remedies under Bivens for
foreign citizens, military personnel, and enemy combatants.161 First,
foreign citizens present a greater risk to foreign policy and the
exposure of state secrets.162 Further, they are already afforded
remedies under the Alien Tort Statute and the TVPA that American
citizens are not.163 Second, military personnel must forfeit complaints
against their superiors to preserve military command structure and
protect national security.164 And third, designated enemy combatants
have been deemed dangerous not only by the military, but by the
President himself.165
Thus, when it comes to this narrow claim—an American civilian’s
assertion of torture by his own government—the Vance dissenters got
160. Vance, 701 F.3d at 209 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 221–22 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); see also
discussion supra Section II.B.3.
161. Vance, 701 F.3d at 209 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 221–22 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); Lebron v.
Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 2009); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp.
2d 94, 110 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012); In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479
F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom, Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also
discussion supra Section II.B.3.
162. See Ali, 649 F.3d 762; Arar, 585 F.3d at 579; Rasul, 563 F.3d 527; Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d
at 209; Doe, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 111; Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85; see also discussion supra
Section II.B.3.
163. Vance, 701 F.3d at 209 (Wood, J., concurring); id. at 221–22 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
164. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 700.
165. Lebron, 670 F.3d at 549.
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it right. It would not only be hypocritical, but it would be
fundamentally unjust to provide a remedy in U.S. courts for alien
citizens tortured by their government but not for American civilians
tortured by the United States government. A remedy is not only
necessary—it is right.
CONCLUSION
Above all else, policy reasons justify the allowance of Bivens
claims. Although torture-based claims may pose risks to national
security and military authority, the conscience of the United States is
put at risk if the judiciary forfeits American ideals and allows the
torture of U.S. citizens to proceed without holding the actors
accountable for their wrongdoing.166 Despite the challenges of the
war on terror, torture is not now and never has been approved of in
modern American history.167 Vance’s attorney in his suit against
Rumsfeld emphasized that “[t]reating an American citizen in this
fashion would have been unimaginable before 9/11.”168
While ideally the torture of citizens at the hands of American
officials would never occur, where it does, accountability for such
actions is essential.169 Commenting on the diminishing protection of
liberty in the United States, plaintiff Donald Vance observed, “the
same democratic ideals [the United States is] trying to instill in the
fledgling democratic country of Iraq, from simple due process to the
Magna Carta, we are absolutely, positively refusing to follow
ourselves.”170 Such casting aside of individual liberties falls far short
166. In the moments before his release from detention, officials interrogated Vance about his future
plans to take legal action. Michael Moss, American Recalls Torment as a U.S. Detainee in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 21932011. He recalled, “[t]hey asked me if I was
intending to write a book, would I talk to the press, would I be thinking of getting an attorney. I took it
as, ‘Shut up, don’t talk about this place,’ and I kept saying, ‘No sir, I want to go home.’” Id.
167. The United States has made its prohibition against torture clear on a number of occasions,
serving as a party to international treaties against torture, including the Convention Against Torture and
the Geneva Convention. See NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 150, §§ 10:19:23.
168. Moss, supra note 167.
169. Accountability for constitutional violations is a key tenet of American values and yet, Vance was
left to feel as though “Saddam Hussein had more legal counsel than [he] ever had” while detained. Id.
170. Id.
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of the nation’s ideals. Due process and freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment are not luxuries or privileges; they are rights,
and it is the duty of the judiciary to uphold them.
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